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ABSTRACT 
 Virtualization has become ubiquitous in cyberspace over the last decade, 
expanding into cloud technology and embedded mobile devices. Outside of a highly 
sophisticated user community, consumer demand has yet to realize the need for creation 
of a high-fidelity virtual environment, resulting in a lack of specialized hypervisor design 
and a stall in the evolution of a higher level of fidelity in virtual hardware. 
 Most modern hypervisors rely on virtual hardware designed to meet the minimum 
requirements of computing, leading to a low-fidelity implementation in virtual systems 
when compared to their non-virtualized counterparts. High-fidelity can be achieved by 
effectively emulating these physical characteristics in a virtual environment that could 
enable further development of cyber operations by providing all the benefits of 
virtualization coupled with a specialized high-fidelity execution environment. 
 This thesis aggregates and categorizes fidelity variance between virtual machines 
and their physical counterparts, and classifies these variances into five domains based on 
their unique characteristics and potential for application in high-fidelity virtualization.  
We further conducted an in-depth analysis on each domain to assess the challenges and 
practicality of implementation in a high-fidelity virtualization environment.  Finally, we 
presented a methodology to emulate physical characteristics of virtual hardware to create 
a high-fidelity virtual machine. 
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Virtualization has become ubiquitous in cyberspace over the last decade, expanding 
into cloud technology and embedded mobile devices. It provides many advantages across 
the cyber spectrum, including efficiency, isolation, flexibility, and scalability. Driven by 
consumer demands throughout the Department of Defense (DoD) and industry 
virtualization has evolved to provide a host of solutions. Outside of a highly sophisticated 
user community, consumer demand has yet to realize the need for creation of a high-fidelity 
virtual environment, resulting in a lack of specialized hypervisor design and a stall in the 
evolution of a higher level of fidelity in virtual hardware. 
Most modern hypervisors rely on virtual hardware designed to meet the minimum 
requirements of computing, leading to a low-fidelity implementation in virtual systems 
when compared to their non-virtualized counterparts. For instance, physical sensor 
characteristics of virtual hardware, such as Central Processing Unit (CPU) temperature, are 
not emulated in most modern hypervisors. As a result, cyber operations designed to 
manipulate, or take advantage of, physical sensor data become ineffective in virtualized 
environments. For example, a cyber-attack designed to directly manipulate CPU 
temperature information will be rendered ineffective in a virtual environment because 
virtual CPUs are not emulated at a level of fidelity to support such functionality. This lack 
of functionality is seen to be the case for almost all hardware sensor information in virtual 
environments, creating significant shortcomings in virtualization application and offering 
a unique opportunity for the evolution of virtualization technology tailored specifically 
toward specialized cyber operations. Effectively emulating these physical characteristics 
in a virtual environment could enable further growth and development of cyber operations 
by providing all the benefits of virtualization coupled with a specialized high-fidelity 
execution environment. 
2 
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this work was to identify potential methods of creating a high-
fidelity virtual environment conducive to specialized cyber operations. This research also 
defined an initial methodology to integrate high-fidelity virtual hardware in a VM to enable 
holistic emulation of physical sensor data.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
We sought to achieve the objective of this thesis by bounding our research with 
three research questions.  
1. Primary Question 
What specific characteristics not currently implemented in modern virtualization 
technology could be included to extend a VM to create a high-fidelity virtualized 
environment? 
2. Secondary Question 
Which of these five HFV characteristics could be used to influence the behavior of 
a virtual machine if emulated appropriately? 
3. Tertiary Question 
How could one of these characteristics be emulated at a level of fidelity necessary 
to influence VM behavior in the same manner it would influence NVM behavior? 
D. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
This research will benefit the DoD by providing a methodology to develop high-
fidelity virtual environments that can be implemented to create specialized VMs tailored 
to cyber operations. This research will also enable the cyber warfare community to develop 
high-fidelity target emulation for malware testing and analysis in offensive and defensive 
cyber operations and will be applicable in industry across multiple cyber domains to 
include hypervisors, virtual machines, and cyber security.  
3 
E. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized into four additional chapters: background, high-fidelity 
virtualization characteristics, high-fidelity virtualization assessment, and conclusion and 
future work. 
The next chapter provides a taxonomy of the various virtualization domains that 
are currently implemented across the DoD and industry. Key terminology related to 
virtualization is discussed to establish a clear vocabulary for the purposes of this thesis. 
This chapter also discusses a high-level overview of VMs and hypervisors, and discusses 
the several technologies used to virtualize the CPU, memory, and I/O devices. Lastly, this 
chapter introduces and formally defines the concept of high-fidelity virtualization. 
Chapter III outlines a taxonomy of high-fidelity virtualization characteristics that 
could potentially be implemented in a high-fidelity virtual environment. Several domains 
are defined to categorize characteristics based on their roles in virtualization technology 
and their potential impact on high-fidelity virtualization.  
Chapter IV discusses the benefits, challenges and considerations, and potential 
methodologies for each high-fidelity virtualization domain outlined in the previous 
chapter. It assesses each domain based on the concept of creating a VM that more 
holistically emulates a non-virtualized machine. 
The last chapter addresses overarching challenges and limitations of developing a 
high-fidelity hypervisor, and identifies areas that require further research and development 
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II. BACKGROUND  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Before exploring the concept of high-fidelity virtualization, it is important to 
explore the key concepts related to virtualization technology. Virtualization is a complex 
concept that has been defined in many ways. This complexity is due, in large part, to the 
inherently different types and implementations of virtualization that exist today. 
Virtualization can be broadly defined as a layer of abstraction in the form of software that 
is inserted at various levels of computing architecture in order to achieve a multitude of 
computing solutions or operating environments. In order to define virtualization to an 
appropriate scope for this thesis, exploration of the many facets of virtualization technology 
must first be discussed.  
B. SURVEY OF VIRTUALIZATION TECHNOLOGY 
VMware provided a solution to x86 virtualization in the late 1990s resulting in a 
revival of virtualization technology that was previously considered impractical due to 
technical roadblocks. Coupled with fast-paced advancements in hardware technology, the 
virtualization landscape quickly blossomed, becoming rather complex and amorphous, 
with many different implementations being utilized across industry and the DoD. This 
section will explain how virtualization technology can generally be broken down into seven 
domains.  
1. Desktop 
Desktop virtualization creates a layer of abstraction between hardware and the 
desktop presented to the user. The “desktop” in this sense includes the operating system, 
applications, and user data [1]. This layer of abstraction can come in two different forms 
in the context of desktop virtualization: local and streaming [1].  
Local desktop virtualization, also referred to as “client,” can be distinguished by an 
execution environment for the user residing on the client machine. In this model, the 
virtualized desktop and the hardware required to execute that desktop are both on the same 
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machine [1]. VMware Workstation, VirtualBox, and Xen are examples of client desktop 
virtualization technology. 
Streaming desktop virtualization, referred to as Virtual Desktop Infrastructure by 
VMware, or “server desktop virtualization,” can be characterized by an execution 
environment for the user’s virtualized desktop residing in a remote location, separate from 
the client machine. In this model, the virtualized desktop is executed in a remote 
environment and then streamed to the client via network protocols [1]. The desktop can be 
provided remotely by cloud-based solutions as well as remote servers. Streaming desktop 
virtualization via the cloud is also referred to as Desktop as a Service, where the virtual 
desktop is streamed to the end user via cloud service providers rather than local servers. 
VMware Horizon and Citrix Virtual Desktop are examples of streaming desktop 
virtualization technology.  
2. Server 
Server virtualization is perhaps most widely thought of as the “traditional” form of 
virtualization. Server virtualization is accomplished by placing a layer of abstraction 
between hardware and a fully functioning server. This layer of abstraction, in the form of 
software, multiplexes the hardware of the machine, allowing multiple “virtual” servers to 
be installed on one physical machine. The multiplexing of hardware resources in order to 
run multiple virtual servers on a single physical machine provides many advantages to 
network administrators, including more efficient power and processing utilization across a 
network. Additional network management-specific features further differentiate server 
virtualization from desktop virtualization. These features allow network administrators to 
quickly and easily maintain, troubleshoot, and optimize their network in ways only possible 
through virtualization technology. VMware ESXi and Xen Server are common forms of 
server virtualization technology. 
3. Application 
Application virtualization refers to the technique of creating a layer of abstraction 
between running applications on a physical machine and the operating system installed on 
that machine. Traditionally, applications are executed and managed directly by an 
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operating system. Application virtualization, however, isolates an application from the 
operating system utilizing one of two methods: sandboxing or streaming [1]. 
Sandbox application virtualization isolates an application from the operating 
system by packaging all the application dependencies into a single instantiation of the 
application. The application runs in its own execution environment, isolated from other 
applications concurrently running on the machine, without any dependencies being 
provided from the operating system. Docker containers and Java Virtual Machines are 
examples of sandbox application virtualization [2].  
Streaming application virtualization refers to technology that allows users to run 
applications remotely, from a local server or the cloud, without having to install the 
application locally [3]. Commonly known as Software as a Service in the cloud computing 
industry, streaming application virtualization enables end users or administrators to avoid 
application installation and management. Microsoft App-V and Office365 are popular 
applications that utilize streaming application virtualization technology.  
4. Storage 
Storage virtualization refers to the technique of creating a layer of abstraction between 
physical storage and virtual storage [1]. Storage virtualization can be achieved by aggregation 
or multiplexing methods. For instance, storage virtualization is achieved in redundant array of 
inexpensive disks (RAID) technology by aggregating an array of disks into a single virtual disk 
[4]. In contrast, partitioning a hard drive into multiple, isolated blocks is a form of multiplexing 
storage virtualization on a local machine [3]. 
5. Network 
Network virtualization refers to technologies that create a layer of abstraction in the 
network layer of the Open System Interconnection model, or the internet layer of the 
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) model which are responsible for 
routing traffic through a network. These technologies offer administration and security 
solutions for network administrators and end users, respectively. Typical examples of 
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network virtualization technology include Virtual Local Area Networks, Virtual IP, and 
Virtual Private Networks [2].  
6. Resource 
Resource virtualization refers to the techniques employed by operating systems to 
insert a layer of abstraction between hardware resources and the processes and applications 
that use them. Although often overlooked as a form of virtualization, resource 
virtualization is a common form of virtualization, and in one form or another, it is employed 
by nearly all operating systems. Effectively, the operating system serves as this layer of 
abstraction and “virtualizes” physical resources by various methods in order to meet the 
demands of all running processes on the machine. Paging files and process management 
are examples of resource virtualization.  
7. Mobile 
Mobile virtualization refers to virtualization techniques specifically applied in the 
domain of mobile devices, which in this context refers to modern embedded systems such 
as smart phones, tablets, automobiles, control devices, and consumer electronics [5]. 
Traditional embedded systems were narrow in scope and purpose, and came preloaded with 
a closed software stack from the device vendor [5]. However, modern embedded devices 
typically take on the functionality of the PC, running high-level, application-oriented 
operating systems [5]. Virtualization is highly desired in this domain for its ability to run 
multiple operating systems on a single device in addition to the security benefits 
virtualization provides through isolation [6].  
C. COMPARING TERMINOLOGY 
The scope of this thesis has been strictly in the context of the desktop virtualization 
domain discussed previously, specifically, local desktop virtualization. As the scope of 
virtualization narrows, the definition of what classifies as virtualization also narrows and 
must be refined.  
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1. Virtualization 
Bugnion, Nieh, and Tsafrir define virtualization as “the application of the layering 
principle through enforced modularity, whereby the exposed virtual resource is identical 
to the underlying physical resource being virtualized” [4]. Singh defines virtualization as 
a framework or methodology of dividing the resources of a computer into 
multiple execution environments, by applying one or more concepts or 
technologies such as hardware and software partitioning, time-sharing, 
partial or complete machine simulation, emulation, quality of service, and 
many others. [7] 
These definitions describe a “layering principle” of “identical resources” and 
“multiple execution environments,” all of which are essential aspects of virtualization 
technology. Combining these concepts, we define virtualization for the scope of this thesis 
as a layer of abstraction in the form of software that creates one or more execution 
environments, where the execution environment requires no cross-architectural translation, 
and directly executes on the CPU. 
2. Emulation 
The term “emulation” is often confused with virtualization, and the terms are often 
used interchangeably; however, they are not the same.  
Bugnion, Nieh, and Tsafrir define emulation as “a level of indirection in software 
to expose a virtual resource or device that corresponds to a physical device, even if it is not 
present in the current computer system” [4]. Mallach defines emulation as “a process 
whereby one computer is set up to permit execution of programs written for another 
computer” [8]. These definitions describe the essential feature that defines emulation, i.e., 
that it replicates one hardware architecture on another [4]. The process of translating one 
CPU architecture to another introduces a significant amount of overhead not required in a 
virtualized machine.  
Machine emulators are typically used to provide cross-architectural support for 




Simulation is another term often used in conjunction with virtualization and 
emulation, and must be examined to understand the relationship between the three terms.  
A computer simulator “is typically implemented as a normal user-level application, 
with the goal of providing an accurate simulation of the virtualized architecture, and often 
runs at a small fraction of native speed, ranging from a 5 to a 1000 times slowdown, 
depending on the level of simulation detail” [4].  
Since a simulator is run at the application level, it incurs a significant “processing 
tax” [4]. As a result, simulation is the least efficient method in terms of equivalence to a 
physical machine. Machine simulators are typically used for modelling and analysis of 
complex problems. Simulink is an example of machine simulator software.  
To summarize, the predominant distinguishing factor between the three terms is 
determined by the method of CPU execution. Both virtualization and emulation execute on 
native hardware, however, they do so in different ways. Virtualization is defined by CPU 
execution that requires no cross-architectural translation, while emulation does require 
such translation. In contrast, simulation CPU execution occurs entirely in software whereby 
the simulated instruction set does not directly execute on the host CPU.  
It is important to note that the term virtualization may still be used to describe 
software that utilizes emulation techniques to create a virtual environment. The nuanced 
differentiation between virtualization and emulation in this case is that a virtualizer will 
execute a predominant subset of CPU instructions without requiring the need for 
translation, whereas an emulator will translate many, if not all, instructions prior to CPU 
execution. Therefore, a virtualizer may perform translation on some instructions and still 
be considered a virtualizer, so long as most instructions are executed without the need for 
translation.  
In terms of processing speed, virtualization offers the optimal solution, followed by 
emulation, and simulation. Even though emulation requires architectural translation, 
emulation still offers faster processing speeds than simulation since a simulation does not 
execute directly on a host CPU.  
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D. VIRTUAL MACHINES 
Virtual machines are perhaps the most common implementations of virtualization 
technology. Virtual machines provide efficient solutions to many problems faced by the 
DoD and industry today. They can be used by network administrators to allow more 
efficient use of resources by consolidating multiple servers on one physical machine, or by 
security professionals to create an isolated and secure operating environments from which 
to test software [7].  
Popek and Goldberg define a virtual machine as “an efficient, isolated duplicate of 
the real machine” [9]. A virtual machine is often referred to as the “guest,” and the machine 
it is installed on is often referred to as the “host.” This language makes it easier to describe 
virtual environments. Applying Popek and Goldberg’s definition, the guest machine is the 
“isolated duplicate” of the host machine. This concept can be easily described pictorially. 
Figure 1 represents a Non-Virtualized Machine (NVM) while Figure 2 represents a 
computer implementing virtualization with two virtual guest machines installed on a host 
machine. We will use the term NVM to describe a traditional machine not employing 
virtualization techniques throughout the remainder of this thesis.  
 
Figure 1. Non-Virtualized Machine. Source: [10].  
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Figure 2. Virtualized Machine. Source: [10]. 
As Figure 2 depicts, a virtual machine is a representation of a physical machine 
using software. The virtualization software, illustrated as “VMware Virtualization Layer” 
in the figure, serves as the layer of abstraction between physical hardware on the host, and 
the virtual machine guests. The virtualization layer is responsible for multiplexing the host 
machine’s physical resources into “virtual resources” which are used by the virtual 
machines. This multiplexing allows the virtualization layer to allocate several 
instantiations of virtual resources and thus create multiple virtual machines on one physical 
host. Creating virtual machines is not a trivial process, and several technical factors must 
be considered when implementing them.  
Popek and Goldberg defined virtual machines in their paper Formal Requirements 
for Virtualizable Third Generation Architectures in 1974. They described three properties 
that must be present for a machine to be considered a “virtual machine” and thus qualify 
as an implementation of virtualization technology: efficiency, resource control, and 
equivalence [9]. 
The efficiency property states “all innocuous instructions are executed on the 
hardware directly, with no intervention at all on the part of the [virtualization layer]” [9]. 
In simpler terms, this property states that the virtual machine must execute the majority of 
its CPU instructions directly on the host CPU. This property ensures that the virtual 
machine processes instructions in as close as possible to the time it would take a NVM to 
13 
perform the same instruction. The efficiency property also excludes emulation from 
qualifying as a virtual machine, as emulators do not execute instructions directly on the 
host CPU.  
The resource control property states “it must be impossible for [an] arbitrary 
program to affect the system resources” [9]. In other words, no program running in the 
virtual machine should be able to interact directly with the host’s hardware resources 
without allocation of control from the virtualization layer. This property serves to enforce 
isolation and security of the host machine from the virtual machine.  
The equivalence property states that all programs executing in the virtual machine 
must “perform in a manner indistinguishable” from the manner they would perform on a 
NVM [9]. This property, also referred to as fidelity [2], serves as a measure to verify that 
the virtual machine behaves in a manner as close as possible to a NVM.  
These properties define what constitutes a virtual machine, but the virtual machine 
itself is incapable of enforcing them. The responsibility of satisfying and enforcing these 
three requirements lies within the virtualization layer, also known as the hypervisor. 
E. HYPERVISORS 
Hypervisors serve as the virtualization layer between hardware and software to 
create an execution environment for the virtual machine. Popek and Goldberg refer to 
hypervisors as “virtual machine monitors” when describing the properties of virtual 
machines [9]. Although the properties of efficiency, resource control, and equivalence are 
properties of virtual machines, they are also characteristics of hypervisors, as the 
hypervisor is responsible for creating an execution environment bounded by these 
properties.  
The main role of the hypervisor is to multiplex resources of the host machine and 
control access to those resources for distribution across all virtual machines operating on 
the host, while enforcing the properties of efficiency, resource control, and equivalence. 
Hypervisors come in two basic types: Type I and Type II. 
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1. Type I Hypervisors 
Type I hypervisors, also known as “bare metal” hypervisors, are installed directly 
on hardware. Figure 3 illustrates a Type I hypervisor. 
 
Figure 3. Type I Hypervisor. Source: [10]. 
Type I hypervisors are distinguished by requiring no operating system on the host 
machine. The hypervisor serves as both an operating system and a virtual machine monitor 
simultaneously. Type I hypervisors have full control of the host machine and do not need 
to coordinate resource allocation with an operating system. VMware ESXi and Xen are 
examples of Type I hypervisors.  
2. Type II Hypervisors 
Type II hypervisors run as an application “on top” of a host machine operating 
system. Figure 4 illustrates a Type II hypervisor. 
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Figure 4. Type II Hypervisor. Source: [10]. 
Type II hypervisors are a unique type of application and interact with host hardware 
differently than a typical application. Type II hypervisors have full control of the host CPU 
while executing the guest operating system [4]. This process is balanced between the 
hypervisor and the host operating system utilizing a “world switch,” similar in function to 
a CPU context switch [4]. An example of a Type II hypervisor is VMware Workstation or 
VirtualBox. 
F. VIRTUALIZATION TECHNIQUES 
The virtualization industry has developed many techniques for creating 
hypervisors, each with its own advantages and disadvantages. The hypervisor is 
responsible for virtualizing three main hardware components to create a virtual machine: 
CPU, memory, and input/output devices.  
1. CPU Virtualization 
Perhaps the most important decision when developing a hypervisor is the method 
in which the CPU will be virtualized. The method chosen is dependent on the Instruction 
Set Architecture (ISA) of the CPU, as each architecture is different and requires a 
hypervisor tailored to the specifics of how that ISA executes instructions. Due to its wide 
use by consumers, Intel’s x86 is the most commonly virtualized ISA [11]. The x86 
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instruction set was originally thought to be not “classically virtualizable” due in part to the 
way x86 handles privileged instructions run in user mode [12]. “Classically virtualizable” 
refers to the ability to virtualize an architecture solely using the trap-and-emulate method, 
explained below [12]. However, in 1998 VMware developed a method to virtualize x86 
architecture utilizing binary translation [13]. This thesis focuses strictly on Intel x86 
architecture virtualization.  
a. Intel x86 Privilege Levels 
Intel x86 processors run natively in protected mode, which is used to establish 
privilege levels necessary to separate kernel execution from user mode execution [4]. 
Figure 5 illustrates the Intel x86 privilege levels, also referred to as rings. Ring 3 represents 
the least privileged ring and is allocated for user mode operations. Ring 0 represents the 
ring with maximum privilege and is allocated for kernel mode operations. User applications 
normally execute in Ring 3 while the computer operating system runs in Ring 0 [13].  
 
Figure 5. Intel x86 Privilege Levels. Source: [13]. 
b. Trap-and-Emulate 
Under the trap-and-emulate paradigm, all privileged instructions from the virtual 
machine are “trapped” by hypervisor to prevent executing guest privileged instructions on 
the host CPU. Once the instruction is trapped, the hypervisor emulates the result of the 
privileged instruction in the virtual environment as if it had been executed on the CPU 
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directly [11]. This process effectively isolates the virtual machine and prevents it from 
executing privileged instructions in the host execution environment, which would pose a 
significant security risk.  
Trap-and-emulate alone was not sufficient to virtualize x86 architecture, however, due 
in part to the inability to force all privileged instructions to trap to the hypervisor [11]. To 
solve this problem, VMware introduced binary translation [13].  
c. Binary Translation 
Binary translation is an efficient form of emulation [4] and is only utilized when 
executing guest kernel mode instructions [11]. All user mode instructions executed by the 
guest are directly executed on the host CPU and are not passed to the binary translator. 
When the guest attempts to execute kernel mode instructions, they are intercepted by the 
binary translator and grouped into blocks. The translator then processes the blocks and 
translates only the privileged instructions into unprivileged, user mode instructions. Once 
a block is translated, it is cached in order to prevent future translations. Over time, a 
decreasing number of translations occur as the translator stores the working set of the 
virtual machine [11]. VMware utilizes binary translation and full virtualization to provide 
virtualization solutions to consumers [13].  
d. Full Virtualization 
In a full virtualization model, the guest operating system is completely unaware 
that it is operating in a virtual environment. The guest operating system is unaltered and 
can be installed on the virtual machine directly from the manufacturer. The guest OS will 
request to execute privileged instructions identically to the way it would if it were installed 
on a NVM. The hypervisor is responsible for catching those privileged instructions, using 
either trap-and-emulate or binary translation techniques. VMware utilizes binary 
translation in their full virtualization model. Figure 6 illustrates an implementation of full 
virtualization utilizing binary translation. 
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Figure 6. Intel Full Virtualization with Binary Translation CPU 
Execution. Source: [13]. 
The hypervisor resides in Ring 0 in full virtualization while the guest OS resides in 
Ring 1. All guest user applications reside in Ring 3 and will directly execute on the host 
CPU. When the guest OS makes instruction calls from Ring 1, the hypervisor performs 
binary translation and runs the translated binary on the host CPU. Full virtualization is 
valued by consumers due to its portability and ease of use, because it does not require 
operating system modifications.  
e. Paravirtualization 
Paravirtualization, commonly referred to as Operating System Assisted 
Virtualization [13], was first widely implemented by Xen. Unlike full virtualization, 
paravirtualized operating systems must be modified to create “hypercalls” [14]. Hypercalls, 
similar to traditional system calls, are utilized by the guest operating system to 
communicate directly with the hypervisor, and consist of rewritten privileged instructions 
that can be directly executed on the host CPU [4]. The Xen paravirtualized hypervisor 
operates using only direct execution, and removes the need for the hypervisor to perform 
trap-and-emulate or binary translation techniques [14]. Unlike full virtualization, the guest 
operating system recognizes it is operating in a virtual machine since it is communicating 
directly with the hypervisor. The Xen hypervisor operates in Ring 0 while the guest OS 
operates in Ring 1 in the same manner as full virtualization [4]. Paravirtualization offers a 
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significant performance advantage in many cases due to the reduced overhead as a result 
of not requiring trap-and-emulate or binary translation methods [14]. 
f. Hardware-Assisted CPU Virtualization 
Intel and AMD implemented first-generation hardware support for virtualization in 
the form of VT-x and AMD-V, respectively. This first-generation support was designed 
primarily to improve CPU virtualization by introducing a new method of virtualization that 
does not require paravirtualization or binary translation [4].  
Intel VT-x introduced an additional “root mode” of execution wherein both the 
hypervisor and the host operating system operate, while the guest machine operates in 
“non-root” mode [4]. Root mode was designed to only be utilized for virtualization 
purposes and the CPU can transition between root mode and non-root mode based on single 
instructions, removing the need for a complex set of instructions prior to a transition 
between modes [4]. The transition from root to non-root mode is known as a VM Entry on 
the Intel CPU, while the transition from non-root mode to root mode is known as a VM 
Exit [15]. Non-root mode was designed to allow the guest machine to execute privileged 
instructions directly on the processor without requiring a trap from the hypervisor. Since 
non-root mode is a duplicate of the root mode architecture, any privileged instructions 
executed in non-root mode only have an effect in the guest machine and do not influence 
host machine behavior. Traps are still required in some circumstances, however, such as 
when the CPU transitions from non-root mode to root mode, referred to as an “exit” [11]. 
First-generation hardware support for virtualization eliminated the need for binary 
translation [16]. Figure 7 depicts Intel VT-x privilege rings.  
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Figure 7. Intel Hardware-Assisted CPU Execution. Source: [13]. 
2. Memory Virtualization 
Managing memory allocation between a host-physical machine and a guest-virtual 
machine is a very crucial process in virtualization. Allowing either the guest or host to 
write or access the other’s memory space could cause fatal system errors. An important 
distinction in memory virtualization is the difference between guest-virtual memory and 
guest-physical memory. From the perspective of the host, both are considered “virtual” 
memory and must be mapped to the host-physical memory. However, from the perspective 
of the guest, virtual and physical memory are equivalent to virtual and physical memory in 
any NVM, and function in the same manner as managed by the operating system. Figure 8 
helps illustrate the difference between these layers of abstraction; “machine memory” in 
this figure is also referred to as host-physical memory.  
 
Figure 8. Memory Virtualization. Source: [13]. 
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a. Memory Virtualization without Hardware Support 
The initial method of memory virtualization prior to the introduction of hardware 
support was through the use of shadow paging [4]. Shadow paging is a technique used in 
full virtualization whereby the hypervisor maintains a software-defined shadow page table 
mapping guest-virtual memory to host-physical memory [4], similar to the way in which 
an operating system maintains a page table to map virtual memory to physical memory 
locations. A shadow page table is used as an additional layer of abstraction between 
memory mapping and can cause large overhead due to the added layer of complexity for 
page table lookups. Shadow paging became inefficient with the arrival of hardware support 
for memory virtualization [4]. 
b. Memory Virtualization with Hardware Support 
Second-generation hardware support for memory virtualization came in the form 
of Extended Page Tables in the case of Intel, and Rapid Virtualization Indexing in the case 
of AMD [11]. Although different in name, both technologies behave in a similar manner 
and are also referred to more broadly as Nested Page Tables, or nested paging [11]. Nested 
paging introduced a method wherein the hypervisor is not required to manage software-
defined shadow page tables [4]. To accomplish this technique, the traditional hardware-
defined page table used by the operating system is combined with the software-defined 
page table used by the hypervisor using strictly hardware [4]. Nested paging allows the use 
of one combined page table for both the host operating system and the guest virtual 
machine, removing the overhead accumulated in shadow paging from performing two 
Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB) mappings to resolve virtual-guest addresses to host-
physical addresses. Nested page tables dynamically work in two different modes to allow 
virtual-guest addresses to be mapped directly to host-physical addresses [11].  
3. Input / Output Device Virtualization 
I/O devices comprise the third category of hardware components that must be 
virtualized to create a virtual machine. A hypervisor must implement a method to virtualize 
physical I/O devices in order to account for both the guest and host OS attempting to access 
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these devices. Assuming no hardware support for virtualization, there are two main 
methods of I/O virtualization, delineated by full virtualization and paravirtualization. 
In a full virtualization model, the guest OS is unaware it is being virtualized and 
therefore expects to have full control over the I/O devices under its purview. To account 
for this, the hypervisor “interposes” on the guest machine to create virtual I/O devices that 
are not directly connected to physical host devices [4]. This interposition allows the 
hypervisor to trap all requests from the guest machine to I/O devices, and emulate their 
responses in the guest machine, decoupling and recoupling virtual I/O to physical I/O as 
necessary [4]. This provides isolation between the virtual and physical I/O devices through 
a level of indirection in software.  
Paravirtualization affords a different approach to I/O virtualization. A 
paravirtualized OS implements a standardized set of device drivers designed to work with 
virtualization in mind. These guest device drivers are only compatible with the hypervisor 
and cannot interface with any physical devices directly. In some cases, paravirtualized I/O 
offers performance increases but at the cost of requiring modification to the guest OS [4]. 
The introduction of hardware support for I/O virtualization eliminated the need for 
interposition in the form of trap-and-emulate as well as paravirtualization with respect to 
I/O devices [4]. Hardware support introduced a new method called direct device 
assignment, which gives the guest OS direct and exclusive control of the physical I/O 
device. Direct device assignment reduces virtualization overhead but raises two main 
concerns: security and scalability [4]. The ability of the guest machine to access and write 
to physical host I/O memory poses a significant security concern. In addition, scalability 
poses a problem, as the number of physical I/O devices installed on a host machine is much 
smaller than the number of potential guest machines that could be operating the same host 
machine, causing a bottleneck in allocation. Both of these problems are solved by hardware 
support via the I/O Memory Management Unit (IOMMU) and Single-Root I/O 
Virtualization (SRIOV) [4]. 
The IOMMU adds a layer of abstraction via hardware in order to provide security 
between the guest and host machine. Rather than allowing the guest OS to make direct 
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memory accesses and directly receive interrupts to/from physical I/O devices, the IOMMU 
acts as an intermediary, translating virtual memory accesses/interrupt vectors to physical 
addresses/interrupts vectors via lookup tables defined in the hypervisor [4]. This process 
effectively isolates the guest and host machine while still allowing the guest to have 
“direct” access to the I/O device [4]. 
SRIOV solves the scalability problem by introducing I/O devices capable of 
multiplexing themselves to software. Traditionally, the OS is responsible for multiplexing 
I/O devices; however, SRIOV devices are capable of presenting multiple virtual instances 
of itself to the OS that can each be directly assigned to a guest machine [4]. SRIOV devices 
efficiently multiplex themselves at the hardware level, allowing guest machines to access 
them directly with no intervention or management from the hypervisor [4].   
E. HIGH-FIDELITY VIRTUALIZATION 
High-Fidelity Virtualization (HFV) is a new domain of virtualization technology 
that focuses on improving upon the equivalence property of virtual machines defined by 
Popek and Goldberg. The principle idea behind HFV is to improve upon an existing 
hypervisor in order to facilitate the creation of a virtual machine that more closely captures 
the holistic operation of a NVM.  
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, virtualization in this context is not to be 
confused with emulation. There has been much work in the field of high-fidelity emulation 
of many different platforms, which can be very useful in application development, where 
new applications can be tested in a holistic environment. Genymotion, for example, is a 
high-fidelity android emulator that emulates battery, Global Positioning System data, 
accelerometer, network connectivity, and multi-touch functionality of smartphones on a 
desktop or in the cloud [17]. This software qualifies as a high-fidelity emulator due to the 
level of equivalence it provides in emulating physical device characteristics and signals in 
software. HFV seeks to achieve the same goal, but through virtualization rather than 
emulation.  
In a research paper titled High Fidelity Virtualization of Cyber-Physical Systems, 
Zhang, Xie, Dong, Yang, and Zhou introduced a novel approach to synchronize a virtual 
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machine with a physical component emulator [18]. The focus of this research was to enable 
“real software, virtual hardware, and virtual physical components to execute in a holistic 
virtual execution environment.” In this research, the term virtualization is used to describe 
the holistic virtual environment created by the synchronization of an emulated virtual 
machine and a physical component emulator [18].  
Zhang et al. performed two experiments to demonstrate the integration of cyber and 
physical components in a holistic virtual environment. They developed a physical 
component emulator using MATLAB to emulate physical components such as sensors, 
actuators, and control plants and utilized a QEMU virtual machine to emulate a cyber-
physical system software controller [18].  
In the first experiment, Zhang et al. created a virtual execution environment for a 
TableSat cyber-physical system. TableSat is a system used to “emulate the dynamics, 
sensing, and actuation capabilities required for satellite attitude control” [18]. Zhang et al. 
virtualized the TableSat using MATLAB/Simulink to emulate physical components such 
as dynamics, friction, fans, and sensors and used QEMU to virtualize the TableSat software 
controller [18]. They then developed a synchronization protocol to create a synchronized 
communication channel between QEMU and MATLAB, resulting in a holistic 
virtualization of the TableSat system. They tested and compared the virtual TableSat 
performance against the real TableSat performance and measured the divergence between 
the two systems. This experiment demonstrated that the virtual TableSat could simulate the 
real TableSat with reasonable accuracy [18]. The goal of this experiment was to show that 
it is possible to enable development of software in a virtual environment before the real 
physical environment becomes available [18].  
In the second experiment, Zhang et al. used a similar approach to create a holistic 
virtual environment for an automatic transmission. They used QEMU to emulate the 
automatic transmission controller and MATLAB/Simulink to emulate physical 
components of the transmission. They demonstrated that their virtual transmission 
achieved a higher level of fidelity when compared to a Simulink Stateflow simulation for 
the same transmission [18].  
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The research conducted by Zhang et al. was primarily conducted to demonstrate 
that cyber-physical system software controllers can be tested and developed before 
physical components are available by utilizing virtualization. Although their research was 
designed for cyber-physical systems, it could have potential applications in the field of 
HFV.  
 Due to Goldberg’s law of resource control to define virtual machines, a virtual 
machine must be safely isolated from host hardware in order to prevent unintended security 
breaches. This inherently limits a virtual machine, a virtualized desktop computer in this 
case, from achieving the same level of fidelity as a NVM. A NVM can interact with 
hardware in ways that a virtual machine cannot achieve, however, using the 
synchronization methodology presented by Zhang et al., a new avenue of achieving a 
higher level of fidelity in virtual machines is possible by synchronizing emulated hardware 
with the virtual machine while still obeying the law of resource control outlined by 
Goldberg.  
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided a review of the current domains in virtualization technology. 
This review was conducted to appropriately scope this thesis to the desktop virtualization 
domain. Within the realm of desktop virtualization, we defined and differentiated the terms 
virtualization, emulation, and simulation. This chapter further defined virtual machines and 
hypervisors and discussed their basic operation and interactions. We also examined 
virtualization techniques both with, and without, hardware support for virtualization 
providing a general overview of how the CPU, memory, and I/O devices are virtualized. 
Lastly, we defined HFV and compared this idea to current technologies and research in the 
field of high-fidelity emulation. 
The next chapter will analyze a taxonomy of virtualization characteristics that have 
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III. HIGH-FIDELITY VIRTUALIZATION CHARACTERISTICS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The main body of research that contributes to identification of HFV characteristic 
is in the field of hypervisor detection. This field originated in 2007 after the introduction 
of two hypervisor rootkits in 2006, Blue Pill and Vitriol, released by Joanna Rutkowska, a 
researcher in the field of computer security engineering, and Matasano Security Labs, 
respectively [19]. Later classified as Virtual Machine Based Rootkits (VMBRs), these 
rootkits were designed to be an undetectable form of malware that utilized a hypervisor to 
hide their presence [20]. VMBRs “install a virtual-machine monitor underneath an existing 
operating system and hoists the original operating system into a virtual machine” [20]. This 
process allows the newly installed “ultra-thin hypervisor” to intercept all system calls and 
interrupts in order to hide its presence and discreetly exfiltrate data from the machine 
without triggering any alarm to the native operating system [21]. 
Following the development of VMBRs, the desire to detect these rootkits, and 
thereby detect the presence of hypervisors, became an immediate security goal. As a result 
of this goal, significant research was conducted in the field of hypervisor detection, 
revealing many characteristics that could be used to identify the presence of virtualization. 
These identifying characteristics have an inherently close relationship to the field of HFV. 
Since HFV seeks to present a virtual machine that more holistically resembles a NVM, 
characteristics that can be used to detect hypervisors can also be used in implementing 
High-Fidelity Virtual Machines (HFVMs). A virtual machine that is harder to detect (and 
hence, is closer to being undistinguishable from a NVM) is to a large degree inherently a 
HFVM. The more of these characteristics that can be implemented in HFV, the higher the 
level of fidelity.  
This chapter examines the differences between non-virtual and virtual machines, 
and establishes a taxonomy of characteristics with respect to HFV. Furthermore, this 
chapter describes in depth these hypervisor characteristics through the lens of potential 
implementation in HFV.  
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B. HFV CHARACTERISTIC DOMAINS  
We have organized HFV characteristics into five domains: artifacts, behavior, 
performance, security, and functionality. 
1. Artifacts 
This domain refers to virtual machine artifacts that can be attributed to the footprint 
left behind by the hypervisor. This can include a wide range of characteristics, largely 
dependent on the hypervisor chosen and the operating system being virtualized. All 
hypervisors are unique in the way they provide a virtual environment and, therefore, each 
establishes unique footprints that can further vary based upon the virtualized operating 
system. This discussion of artifacts is not exhaustive, but rather serves to demonstrate the 
most common artifacts left behind by popular commercial hypervisors. We have organized 
these artifacts into three categories based on research by Liston and Skoudis: processes, 
file systems, and registry; virtual hardware; and memory [22]. 
a. Processes, File Systems, and Registry  
Virtualization artifacts can most commonly be found in the virtual machine 
processes, file systems, or registry. Most commercial hypervisors were not designed to 
avoid detection. As a result, many references to the hypervisor manufacturer are 
“imprinted” on the virtual machine when it is created. For example, in the case of VMware 
installed on Windows, over 50 references to “VMware” or “vmx” can be found in the file 
system, and over 300 references can be found in the registry [22]. On Linux, the /proc and 
/sys folders contain numerous references to the hypervisor on a virtualized system [22]. 
Many other Linux commands can be used to reveal the presence of these artifacts such as 
“dmidecode,” “dmesg,” “lshw,” and “lspci,” to name a few [23]. These artifacts can vary 
in number and location based on the specific hypervisor and operating system being 
analyzed, but generally speaking, hypervisor artifacts are typically easy to detect.  
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b. Virtual Hardware  
We can also examine for static artifacts left behind by the hypervisor when creating 
and implementing virtual hardware. We have defined two sub-domains of virtual hardware: 
unique identification and resource allocation.  
(1) Unique Identification  
Virtual hardware can often be uniquely identified based on artifacts imprinted on 
the VM hardware by the hypervisor. For example, the virtual Network Interface Card 
assigned in VMware contains a Media Access Control address with a VMware 
manufacturer code [22]. In addition, the virtual Universal Serial Bus controller and Small 
Computer System Interface controller implemented in VMs can be uniquely identified by 
virtual hardware identifiers [22].  
A similar method was introduced at Black Hat Asia in 2014 by Li et al. [24]. They 
conducted research to demonstrate that a VM could be detected by examining its display 
properties, utilizing a Java web script to return the number of resolutions supported by a target 
machine. Testing their method on a NVM and VMs running in VMware and VirtualBox, they 
observed that the host machine supported 38 resolutions while the VMs supported far fewer: 
25 in the case of VMware and 4 in the case of VirtualBox [24]. In addition, they noted that 
VMware supported a very rare screen resolution, 1041x1041, not commonly found on NVMs 
because odd numbers are not typically used for resolution size [24]. 
(2) Resource Allocation  
Many VMs can be identified heuristically by simply examining the allocation of 
hardware resources. VMs are usually allocated far fewer resources than even modest-sized 
computers, on the order of 20–100 GB of hard drive space and 2 GB of Random-Access 
Memory (RAM). While these artifacts alone cannot be used to identify a VM with absolute 
certainty, they can be an indicator of likely hypervisor detection, supporting other detection 
domains or characteristics.  
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c. Memory  
Virtual machines run on top of host software, which can be a bare metal hypervisor 
(Type I), or a host operating system configuration (Type II). Either way, the VM cannot 
share the same memory space as the underlying host software for security reasons. This 
attribute of virtualization can lead to methods of hypervisor identification through memory, 
as described below.  
(1) Interrupt Descriptor Table  
The Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) is an array of eight byte interrupt descriptors 
used by the CPU to handle interrupts in protected mode [15]. The IDT is referenced by a 
register (IDTR) which holds a pointer to the IDT in memory [15]. Joanna Rutkowska first 
introduced the concept of detecting a virtual machine via the IDTR in a program called The 
Red Pill in 2004 [22]. The Red Pill works by simply running the Store Interrupt Descriptor 
Table (SIDT) instruction, which stores the IDTR in memory, and examining where the IDT 
is located [22]. Rutkowska observed that on NVMs the IDT is located lower in memory 
while on virtual machines it is located higher in memory. Specifically, the IDT is typically 
stored around 0x80ffffff in Windows and 0xc0ffffff in Linux [22]. In contrast, the IDT is 
stored around 0xffXXXXXX in VMware VMs and at 0xe8XXXXXX in VirtualPC VMs 
[22]. The Red Pill simply calls the SIDT instruction and if the IDTR points to a location in 
memory greater than 0xd0XXXXXX, then a hypervisor is likely present [22].  
(2) Global Descriptor Table  
The Global Descriptor Table (GDT) is used by the processor to track memory 
segments using a register, the GDTR, as a pointer to the GDT [25]. The GDT can be used 
to detect a VM in the same manner as the IDT. Tobias Klein developed a VM detection 
tool called “Scoopy” that checks the value of the GDTR [22]. Similar to the IDTR, Klein 
observed that the GDTR is typically stored lower in memory on a NVM and higher in 
memory on a virtual machine [22]. Specifically, on a NVM the GDTR is less than 
0xc0XXXXXX and above 0xc0XXXXXX on a virtual machine [22].  
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(3) Local Descriptor Table  
The Local Descriptor Table is also a table of memory segments tracked by the 
processor, similar to the GDT, except the LDT is used for specific processes [25]. Klein 
also observed that the LDT can be used to identify the presence of a hypervisor in the same 
manner as the IDT and GDT [22]. He noticed that the LDT is typically stored at 
0x00000000 on a NVM, but somewhere else in memory on a virtual machine [22]. 
2. Behavior 
The behavior domain consists of identifiable traits inherent to the behavioral profile 
of virtualization technology. As opposed to static artifacts, the behavior domain measures 
how virtualization technology reacts to various instructions and operations, and compares 
that reaction to how a NVM would react under the same circumstances. Behavioral 
characteristics must be directly or indirectly witnessed and reflect momentary differences 
between non-virtual and virtual machines. We have defined two sub-categories for the 
behavior domain: CPU behavior and hypervisor behavior.  
a. CPU Behavior 
Hardware support for virtualization introduced many new CPU features to facilitate 
virtualization technology. Intel and AMD took similar, but unique approaches to 
introducing their implementation of hardware support. These nuanced approaches resulted 
in unique CPU behavior when handling various virtualization operations. The three 
examples below represent how CPU behavior can be used to identify a virtualization 
profile. 
(1) Translation Lookaside Buffer 
The TLB is a cache of recent memory address translations maintained by the 
operating system kernel [25]. While the page table contains a list of all physical-to-virtual 
address translations, the TLB is a cache of recently used physical to virtual memory 
resolutions. The operating system first checks the TLB for the address translation it needs 
when performing memory access. If the address is not in the TLB, the operating system 
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must perform a “page walk” and check the entire page table until it finds the address 
mapping it needs, resulting in much longer memory access times [25].  
CPUs with virtualization support exhibit unique TLB behavior when conducting 
VM Exits. Intel VT-x technology flushes the entire TLB upon every VM Exit while AMD-
V technology modifies one TLB entry during every VM Exit [25]. These TLB 
modifications introduce a detection method whereby all entries of the TLB are filled, a VM 
Exit is forced, and modifications to the TLB are measured [25]. If any TLB modifications 
are detected, this indicates virtualization technology is being implemented [26]. Brengel, 
Backes, and Rossow [28] further demonstrated this method to detect hardware-assisted 
virtualization in their research [27].  
(2) Cache Invalidation  
Cache invalidation was first introduced at a Black Hat conference by Ptacek, 
Lawson, and Ferrie [28], and relies on the Invalidate Internal Caches instruction (INVD). 
This instruction invalidates, or “flushes,” all CPU cache before the contents can be written 
to memory [15]. The cache invalidation method reveals the presence of a hypervisor by 
writing a pattern to memory, resulting in the write being queued in the cache, immediately 
followed by a forced VM Exit and an INVD instruction to flush the contents of cache [28]. 
If the pattern previously written to memory persists after the INVD instruction, a 
hypervisor is likely present [28].  
(3) Return Stack Buffer 
The Return Stack Buffer (RSB) is a processor structure used for speculative 
execution. The CPU places the return addresses of the most recent call functions onto the 
RSB [15]. This process creates a cache of return addresses, which speeds up function times 
by preventing retrieval of the return address from main memory upon function exit [15]. 
When a VM Exit is induced to a hypervisor, the hypervisor modifies entries in the 
RSB [19]. Furthermore, Maisuradze and Rossow [29] demonstrated that it is possible to 
detect changes in the RSB cache using several side-channel techniques. Therefore, the 
presence of a hypervisor can be detected by filling the RSB, forcing a VM Exit, and, 
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utilizing the methods proposed by Maisuradze and Rossow, detect any modifications that 
may have occurred in the RSB. RSB changes will indicate the presence of a hypervisor.  
b. Hypervisor Behavior 
Hypervisors must often behave in a unique manner in order to handle normal guest 
OS requests due to the inherent nature of interposition. The hypervisor must ensure the 
rules of efficiency, equivalence, and safety are adhered to in order to maintain its 
qualification as a virtual machine monitor. As such, it must interpose on virtual machines 
to carry out these obligations. In doing so, it reveals unique behavior that can be observed 
and utilized to verify its presence.  
(1) IP Timestamps  
Researchers from Tokyo University of Technology have demonstrated that 
hypervisors can be identified by IP timestamping behavior [30], [31], [32]. Noorafiza et al. 
demonstrated this by exploiting the IP timestamp request option in IP packet headers. The 
IP timestamp is an option that can be implemented in the header of IP packets to measure 
packet delays across a network [33]. The 32-bit timestamp is indicative of the time in the 
target machine, represented in milliseconds [33]. 
In their first experiment, Noorafiza et al. identified the presence of a hypervisor by 
observing a unique deviation in timestamps over a large sample size [30]. They sent 
repetitive timestamp request packets to three target servers on a test network and captured 
the timestamp replies from these three servers. One server had no hypervisor installed, thus 
representing a NVM, while the other two servers both had hypervisors installed, one with 
VMware and one with VirtualBox. Both the VMware and VirtualBox servers had a VM 
running that served as the target of the IP timestamp requests in the experiment. The results 
of the timestamp replies are shown in Figure 9.  
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Figure 9. IP Timestamp Deviation Behavior between a NVM, 
VMware VM, and VirtualBox VM. Source: [30]. 
Figure 9 illustrates that NVMs have a very small timestamp deviation compared to 
virtualized machines. This method can not only differentiate a NVM from a virtualized 
machine, but can also differentiate between hypervisor vendors based on their unique 
behavior [30].  
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In their latest experiment, Noorafiza et al. demonstrated that hypervisors can also 
be fingerprinted by comparing the mean repetition values of timestamps returned by the 
hypervisor [31], [32]. In this experiment, they observed the number of times a target used 
the same timestamp rather than analyzing timestamp deviation in their prior research. They 
tested a NVM and three virtualized machines running three different hypervisors: 
XenServer, VirtualBox, and VMware [32]. Figure 10 illustrates the IP timestamp repetition 
behavior of these four machines.  
 
Figure 10. IP Timestamp Repetition Behavior between a Non-
Virtualized Machine, XenServer VM, VirtualBox VM, and VMware VM. 
Source: [32].  
Figure 10 shows that the machines are distinguishable from one another by their IP 
timestamp repetition count. The NVM used the same timestamp the most, leading to a 
mean repetition number of 4.5, while the hypervisors had much fewer repetitions, resulting 
in smaller mean repetition values of 1.03, 1.95, and 3.15 for XenServer, VirtualBox, and 
VMware respectively [32].  
(2) Hypervisor Communication Channel 
Most commercial hypervisors today implement a form of guest-to-host 
communication channel in order to facilitate ease-of-use operations such as a shared 
clipboard. This communication channel is meant to improve the quality of service for VM 
end users. Although this communication channel offers a level of convenience, it also 
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serves as a blatant indicator that a hypervisor is present. Hypervisors will typically 
implement a guest-to-host communication channel by either subverting current x86 
instructions or creating their own proprietary, non-standard x86 instructions [22]. These 
instructions can be easily observed through hypervisor behavior and can, therefore, confirm 
the presence of virtualization [22].  
3. Performance 
The performance domain is comprised of methods used to determine the presence 
of virtualization based on machine performance. The performance domain is unique from 
the artifact domain in that it is not hypervisor dependent, but rather hardware dependent 
[34]. This domain seeks to reveal a hypervisor by taking advantage of the inherent 
performance differences between VMs and NVMs. We have defined three sub-categories 
for the performance domain: timing, counter-based, and graphical. 
a. Timing 
The timing variance between VMs and NVMs is one of two exceptions to the 
equivalence property of hypervisors stated by Popek and Goldberg [34]. This exception 
arises from the requirement for hypervisors to maintain control of system resources and 
prevent the guest machine from affecting those resources, resulting in certain instruction 
sequences taking longer to execute due to the interposition of the hypervisor [35]. The 
added layer of abstraction that a hypervisor provides inherently induces a “timing tax” on 
many system operations. Timing detection methods seek to reveal the presence of a 
hypervisor by identifying these timing discrepancies.  
(1) Local Timing  
The most basic form of timing detection utilizes a local timing source such as the 
Read Time Stamp Counter (RDTSC) instruction, which measures the amount of CPU 
cycles that have occurred since the last processor reset [15]. A hypervisor can be detected 
by timing CPU instructions that cause unconditional interception by the hypervisor and 
comparing the results to the time it takes to perform a benign instruction that requires no 
hypervisor interception [36]. Since hypervisor interception causes a VM Exit, longer 
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execution times will be observed for privileged instructions due to overhead induced by 
the VM Exit. 
Although the RDTSC instruction is given in this example, any accurate timing 
source on the local machine can be used with this method. Ptacek, Lawson, and Ferrie 
mention several alternatives such as High Precision Event Timer, Local Advanced 
Programmable Interrupt Timer, Programmable Interrupt Timer, and Advanced 
Configuration and Power Interface timers [28].  
(2) Translation Lookaside Buffer 
Although the TLB was mentioned as a component of the behavior domain in the 
previous section, it can also be used to detect a hypervisor via timing methods. The TLB 
is required to be repopulated following every VM Exit due to the TLB flush that occurs. 
This process results in a timing delay, which would not have occurred on a NVM. This 
timing overhead can be directly measured by using a similar process to observe TLB 
behavior in the previous section.  
This timing overhead can be detected by first reading the contents of a memory 
location in order to ensure an entry for that memory location is placed in the TLB. Second, 
measure the amount of time it takes to read that memory location again. Since the address 
for the memory location is in the TLB, this timing measurement will indicate how long it 
takes for the machine to reference the TLB. Third, force a VM Exit, which results in a TLB 
flush on a virtualized machine and no modification of the TLB on a NVM. Lastly, measure 
the time it takes to read the same memory location again [19].  
If the machine is virtualized, the TLB will have been flushed by the VM Exit 
resulting in a necessary page walk to carry out the memory translation. The page walk will 
result in longer memory access times which will contrast to the operation occurring on a 
NVM, requiring no page walk as the memory translation will still be present in the TLB.  
(3) Return Stack Buffer 
The RSB can be used to measure timing differences associated with hypervisors in 
a similar manner to the TLB. This process directly measures the timing overhead caused 
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by the hypervisor’s modification of the RSB during a VM Exit. To achieve this, the RSB 
is populated with enough nested function calls to fill the entire RSB [26]. Next, a VM Exit 
is induced, resulting in some previous RSB entries being evicted by the hypervisor [19]. 
These evictions result in RSB “misses” to occur following the VM Exit while the nested 
function call is being performed [26]. The overhead associated with these RSB misses can 
be measured and compared to the same process without inducing a VM Exit. If a hypervisor 
is present, a timing variation will be observed between these two procedures [26].  
(4) Remote Timing  
One of the earliest remote timing detection methods was introduced by a team from 
Carnegie Mellon in 2008, referred to as “fuzzy benchmarking” [35]. The fuzzy benchmark 
method exploits timing dependencies of virtual machines to reveal their measurable 
overhead [35].  
The fuzzy benchmark method relies on the assumptions that an external, remote 
verifier has root access to the target machine and is capable of installing and running 
benchmarking software within that machine, that the remote verifier has a timing 
mechanism capable of observing the execution time of the software on the target machine, 
and that the remote verifier has a means of obtaining hardware artifacts from the target 
machine to perform deductions on the hardware configuration of the target [35]. Although 
this technique does not require knowledge of the exact hardware configuration, it does need 
some knowledge of the architecture in order to be successful. The higher the fidelity of the 
running hardware configuration on the target, the higher the level of success.  
Assuming these conditions are met, the benchmarking software will be initiated 
remotely which proceeds to execute sensitive instruction sequences on the target designed 
to invoke hypervisor action, if present. These instruction sequences are looped 217 times in 
order to induce measurable overhead and the remote verifier measures the completion time 
of this loop on the target [35]. Once the remote verifier collects the performance data from 
the target, it compares this data to pre-recorded performance data of a NVM with similar 
hardware architecture of the target. If a hypervisor is present on the target, the data will 
indicate a disparity between timing performance of the target machine and the NVM. 
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Figure 11 illustrates observed local execution times for selected sensitive instructions 
performed on a NVM, referred to as “vanilla” in the figure, a VMware virtualized machine, 
and a Xen virtualized machine [35].  
 
Figure 11. Local Execution Times for Selected Sensitive Instructions. 
Source: [35]. 
The authors have demonstrated this method to be successful at not only 
distinguishing between a virtual machine and a NVM, but also distinguishing between 
different hypervisors as indicated by varying performances of CR0 and CR3 read/writes, 
Figure 11(b) and Figure 11(d), respectively. While Figure 11 simply illustrates the 
differences in local execution times, the fuzzy benchmarking method utilizes remote 
detection, across the Internet, which yields even stronger identifying results when using 
CR3 read/writes as indicated by Figure 12. The test in Figure 12 indicates results from 
machines utilizing a Pentium IV processor (P4), an AMD processor with hardware support 
for virtualization (HVM), and two different hypervisors (VMWare and Xen) compared to 
a NVM (Vanilla) [35].  
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Figure 12. Remote CR3 Read/Write Times. Source: [35]. 
Figure 12 clearly shows the longer CR3 write times associated with the three 
hypervisors in comparison to the two NVMs.  
b. Counter-Based Detection  
Counter-Based Detection (CBD) offers a different approach to detecting hypervisor 
performance degradations using a counter-based method. While previous methods rely on 
kernel mode access, CBD methods operate solely in user mode, requiring no elevation of 
privileges [37]. In addition, CBD uses a counter as measurement rather than a timing source 
in order to identify the presence of a hypervisor [38]. Figure 13 illustrates the CBD concept.  
Figure 13 shows how CBD constructs a race condition between two threads on a 
multi-threaded CPU. One thread (CPU0) executes a continuous loop of unprivileged 
instructions such as ADD or NOP, while the second thread (CPU1) executes a continuous 
loop of CPUID instructions [37]. The ADD instruction is a non-sensitive, non-privileged 
instruction meaning that the number of times it executes on a NVM will be the same as it 
would be on a virtualized machine. The ADD execution loop serves as a means of 
benchmarking the CPUID execution loop. The CPUID instruction is a sensitive, non-
privileged instruction which, when executed on a virtualized machine, requires the 
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hypervisor to perform a VM Exit for every CPUID instruction executed [38]. Every VM Exit 
results in a delay caused by the hypervisor, which does not occur on a NVM. This induced 
delay between CPUID instructions is illustrated in Figure 13. Using the ADD execution loop 
as a baseline, the CPUID execution counter can be calculated for a NVM [38].  
 
Figure 13. Counter-Based Detection Concept. Source: [38]. 
When the CBD method is implemented on a machine with a hypervisor, the 
execution counter becomes skewed due to the induced VM Exit delay, significantly 
lowering the number of instructions executed and thus revealing the hypervisors presence. 
Figure 14 demonstrates the variance between the number of CPUID executions on a NVM 
(clear Windows), a normal hypervisor (normal VMM), and a hypervisor implementing 
anti-detection methods (anti-time VMM).  
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Figure 14. CBD Effectiveness. Source: [38]. 
As demonstrated in Figure 14, CBD is a very effective method of detecting a 
hypervisor while affording the flexibility of operating entirely in user space. A NVM 
achieves much higher counter execution times than that of the two hypervisors tested, 
making it clearly distinguishable. 
c. Graphical 
Li et al. introduced a method of VM detection by measuring frame rates and 3D 
rendering performance [24]. They compared the frame rates between a physical host 
machine and a virtual machine while running a video game from a browser using WebGL. 
Li et al. chose to use an application layer approach in order to not only detect virtual 
machines but also virtual appliances. Virtual appliances are a type of virtual machine 
designed for a single, specialized purpose that typically only run one application [24]. 
Figure 15 shows the results of their frame rate testing.  
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Figure 15. Frame Rate Performance Comparison. Source: [24]. 
Figure 15 illustrates the higher frame rate performance by the NVM, labeled as 
“host” in the figure. Decreasing frame rate is observed in virtual machines and continues 
to decline as the number of concurrent VMs on the hypervisor increases. Therefore, it is 
possible to differentiate a NVM from a virtual machine using their web script.  
Another method of detection introduced by Li et al. measured the performance of 
3D rendering. They implemented a web script that measured the number of 3D boxes that 
could be rendered at a fixed frame rate in a NVM compared to rendering performance in 
virtual machines [24]. Figure 16 illustrates the observations from this experiment.  
 
Figure 16. 3D Rendering Performance Comparison. Source: [24]. 
A clear performance difference can be observed whereby the NVM had a much higher 
3D rendering capability as compared to virtual machines. In addition, the 3D rendering 
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performance can be seen to decline as the number of concurrent VMs increases. This 
research suggests graphical performance can be used to accurately detect virtual machines.  
4. Security 
The security domain seeks to identify the differences between a NVM and a virtual 
machine from a security standpoint. Virtualization inherently introduces security threats 
and vulnerabilities that do not exist on NVMs. Identifying these threats and vulnerabilities 
is crucial from the standpoint of HFV. A High-Fidelity Hypervisor (HFH) must be aware 
of these security characteristics in order to implement mitigation techniques suitable for a 
HFV environment. However, the task of identifying and categorizing virtualization 
security concerns is not a trivial process and much research has already been conducted in 
this field. Many researchers have offered different approaches to identifying and 
categorizing virtualization security threats and vulnerabilities.  
The most recent and exhaustive work was conducted by Patil and Modi in 2019 
[39]. We assessed their work to be the most comprehensive study in the field of 
virtualization security, and therefore chose to implement their taxonomy in our HFV 





Figure 17. Taxonomy of Virtualization-Related Security Attacks. 
Source: [39]. 
Patil and Modi identified three main categories of virtualization attack surfaces: 
hypervisors, virtual machines, and virtual networks [39]. Virtual networks are beyond the 
scope of this thesis and will not be discussed in this chapter. Utilizing the taxonomy 
presented by Patil and Modi, we classify two sub-domains for HFV security characteristics: 
hypervisors and virtual machines.  
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a. Hypervisor Security 
Hypervisors introduce a large attack surface due to their inherent role as the 
foundational layer of abstraction necessary to create a virtualization environment. We 
assessed hypervisor security by examining the vulnerabilities, threats, and attacks 
associated with hypervisors in accordance with the model set forth by Patil and Modi [39].  
(1) Vulnerabilities 
Vulnerabilities in the hypervisor vary by hypervisor vendor. Many of these 
vulnerabilities exist due to bugs or poor design by the hypervisor vendor, inadequate 
control over privileged management interfaces, and a lack of control over VM resource 
allocation, to name a few [39]. The Xen hypervisor alone has over 90 vulnerabilities 
documented in the National Vulnerability Database within the last two years. Most of these 
vulnerabilities stem from hypervisor design flaws such as out-of-bounds read/write access, 
infinite loops, and NULL pointer dereferences [39].  
(2) Threats 
The threats associated with hypervisors commonly include compromised 
management interfaces, uncontrolled VM growth, and unauthorized access to hypervisor 
resources [39]. A hypervisor threat model developed by Patil and Modi is illustrated in 
Figure 18. A compromised hypervisor can have cascading effects in a virtualized system, 
as demonstrated by Figure 18. Flawed hypervisor implementation introduces myriad 
security issues, which can affect not only the hypervisor itself, but also VMs under its 
purview to include the virtual interfaces of each VM.  
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Figure 18. Hypervisor Threat Model. Source: [39]. 
(3) Attacks 
There are many examples of hypervisor attacks as discussed in great detail by Patil 
and Modi [39]. We will discuss two of these attacks as examples of the types of 
characteristics relative to the HFV security domain.  
Hyperjacking is a term used to describe a rootkit that attempts to gain control of a 
hypervisor [39]. The rootkit will then deploy a VMBR between host hardware and the OS 
in order to establish interposition beneath the previously installed hypervisor. This allows 
the VMBR to view and control all interactions between the hypervisor and host hardware, 
essentially gaining control over the host and guest machine [39]. Hyperjacking is an attack 
unique to virtualized environments and represents a difference in security characteristics 
between virtualized and NVMs.  
Many attacks on the hypervisor may come from the VMs it hosts. Most hypervisors 
assume their own VMs to be secure, but they can in fact be compromised by an insider 
threat or other malicious software running on the VM OS [39]. The VM can potentially 
perform malicious actions on the hypervisor such as escaping the VM due to hypervisor 
isolation failure, executing code on the hypervisor or leaking hypervisor information via 
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inadequately controlled shared resources, and effectively performing a denial of service 
attack on the hypervisor by consuming all of the host resources [39].  
b. Virtual Machine Security 
Virtual machines represent the second inherent security challenge in virtualization 
technology. VMs are the “edge” of virtualization and therefore are exposed to many 
different interfaces that could be used as attack vectors such as drivers, malicious users, 
and remote access interfaces [39].  
(1) Vulnerabilities 
Patil and Modi suggest three states from which VM vulnerabilities are present: the 
running state, the migration state, and the inactive state. The migration and inactive states 
are beyond the scope of the HFV security domain and will not be addressed in this thesis. 
HFV solely seeks to capture a running state that more holistically represents a NVM. 
Implementing security measures while the HFV machine is powered down are considered 
implied good security practices that are not directly related to HFV. Any security concerns 
in these states are not to be discounted, but their implementation is orthogonal to the 
implementation of HFV.  
Vulnerabilities associated with VMs in the running state may include inadequate 
VM and shared resource isolation, inadequate control over VM rollbacks and management 
interfaces, and default VM creation states [39]. 
(2) Threats 
Common VM threats include illegal access from the hypervisor management 
interface, rogue VMs, and VM specific rootkits [39]. Figure 19 illustrates the VM threat 
model as presented by Patil and Modi. VMs can be compromised by access to the control 





Figure 19. Virtual Machine Threat Model. Source: [39]. 
(3) Attacks 
Patil and Modi provide a comprehensive review of VM attacks; however, we will 
only discuss two attack surfaces as examples of the VM sub-domain. 
Row hammer is a known exploit in certain Dynamic Random-Access Memory 
modules that can result in inadvertent fluctuations of bits in memory. These fluctuations 
are a result of the high memory cell density of Dynamic RAM which leads to electrical 
interference between neighboring cells during memory access [40]. Several researchers 
from Ohio State University demonstrated methods to break virtualization memory isolation 
to access host physical memory by utilizing the row hammer exploit [40]. Although the 
row hammer exploit by itself is not unique to virtualization, when combined with other 
methods it can be used to violate the safety property of virtual machines and represents a 
HFV security characteristic.  
VM isolation failures may introduce the presence of side or covert channels being 
established between co-hosted VMs [39]. A side-channel can be used to leak information 
from one VM to another by using shared hardware caches. Covert channels can leak 
information also using shared hardware caches, shared memory, and achieve high 
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bandwidth extraction using memory buses [39]. Side-channel and covert channel attacks 
represent a security risk that exists when multiple VMs are co-hosted on the same 
hypervisor, and must be considered when operating multiple HFV machines on a single 
platform.  
5. Functionality 
The functionality domain includes the characteristics that differentiate a virtual 
machine from a NVM from the user perspective. The functionality domain identifies the 
functional limitations virtual machines introduce that are not present in NVMs. Functional 
characteristics are represented by any capability a user has on a NVM that they do not have 
on a virtual machine.  
The biggest limitation on user functionality inside a VM compared to functionality 
inside a NVM, is typically related to any interactions with virtual hardware, or physical 
hardware from the perspective of the user. Inherent to virtualization is safety, as set forth 
by Popek and Goldberg in their requirements for a virtual machine. Safety is enforced in 
virtual machines by creating isolation from host hardware through interposition of a 
hypervisor. This isolation prevents user interactions with hardware that would typically be 
possible in a NVM. For instance, the program “HWinfo” allows users to obtain hardware 
sensor information for their machine by installing a kernel mode driver. On a NVM this 
software can be used to obtain a multitude of hardware sensor data to include CPU 
temperature and fan speed, Graphics Processing Unit (GPU) temperature and fan speed, 
battery level, voltage, and capacity, RAM temperature, chipset temperature, and hard drive 
temperature. However, hardware sensor data cannot be obtained in a virtual machine for 
two reasons: the safety requirement isolates the VM from physical hardware, and virtual 
hardware emulated by the hypervisor is not emulated to a high enough degree of fidelity to 
support retrieving and interacting with physical sensor data. The functionality domain 
seeks to create high-fidelity virtual hardware that can be incorporated into the HFV model. 
 In this section, we have introduced the functionality domain. Greater details on 
how this domain could be beneficial for HFV as well as a methodology for its 
implementation are described in Chapter 4. 
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C. SUMMARY 
This chapter proposed five domains for HFV characteristics that could potentially 
be implemented to create a HFVM. These domains represent a unique approach to HFV 
and bring unique challenges in order to be successfully implemented. Many hypervisor 
developers today have focused on providing end users with efficient, scalable and portable 
hypervisors in order to facilitate enterprise needs for virtualization. HFV presents a new 
approach to hypervisor design by implementing one or all domains presented in this 
chapter. The next chapter analyzes each of the five domains for their suitability and 
feasibility for HFV implementation. 
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IV. HFV CHARACTERISTICS ASSESSMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As demonstrated by the survey of characteristics in Chapter 3, HFV is a broad 
concept that offers many different levels of design and opportunities for implementation. 
Since the hypervisor is the foundational layer of virtualization technology, it is perhaps the 
most logical method to implement HFV. A HFH must be designed to incorporate, or in 
some cases mitigate, as many HFV characteristics as possible based on the particular 
purpose of the specific HFV implementation. As such, each HFV domain must be closely 
considered to analyze the benefits, challenges, and potential methodologies that would be 
unique to its implementation in a HFH.  
B. HFV DOMAIN ASSESSMENT  
Each domain is examined below using criteria with respect to HFV: the benefits of 
incorporating their characteristics in HFV, special challenges and considerations associated 
with each domain, and potential methodologies for HFV domains that are not currently 
being implemented or considered in virtualization technology today. This assessment was 
conducted based on the goal of answering how a VM can be created to more holistically 
emulate a NVM. 
1. Artifacts 
Virtualization artifacts can be thought of as artifacts visible on the surface of the 
HFV architecture and represent the appearance of the VM from the perspective of its users. 
Altering the appearance of the VM provides the initial veil for HFV. If VM artifacts are 
not taken into consideration, the VM will be immediately recognizable despite successful 
HFV implementations in all other domains. Therefore, mitigating virtualization artifacts 
represents the first step toward achieving the goal of a comprehensive HFV 
implementation.  
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a. HFV Processes, File System, and Registry Considerations 
Commercial hypervisor technology today is designed based on principles of 
efficiency, scalability, and portability, but not high-fidelity. These design principles lead 
to artifact creation that could be easily avoided in a hypervisor designed around the concept 
of HFV. This concept has already been introduced in several HVM rootkits, namely Blue 
Pill and Vitriol [28], [41]. Artifact mitigation in these cases was established by creating an 
ultra-thin hypervisor, requiring no Basic Input Output System (BIOS), boot sector, or 
persistent storage modifications [21]. A HFH would certainly be more robust in design 
than an “ultra-thin” hypervisor and would therefore require a more tailored design 
approach; however, removing many virtualization artifacts has already been demonstrated. 
This capability was demonstrated by Tamas Lengyel at Hacktivity 2016 using a program 
called Drakvuf [42]. Drakvuf is a hypervisor-based malware analysis tool, designed 
specifically for Xen, to monitor VM security from a separate security stack outside the 
guest VM [43]. Tamas demonstrated that many Xen hypervisor artifacts could be 
manipulated before being returned to the VM to avoid detection by specialized VM 
detection software such as Paranoid Fish [42].  
b. HFV Resource Allocation Considerations 
Drakvuf was also demonstrated to defeat Paranoid Fish detection methods based 
on resource allocation [42]. Paranoid Fish attempts to detect VMs by checking hard drive 
space, memory allocation, and number of CPUs running on the machine [42]. Lengyel 
demonstrated that Drakvuf could be configured to defeat these detection mechanisms using 
Logical Volume Manger and Xen memory sharing Copy-on-Write (CoW) support. CoW 
is a virtual resource allocation method whereby the full allocation is dynamically 
performed, as the system requires the resource. Utilizing CoW, 250Gb can be allocated to 
a VM, but the VM will not use the full 250Gb until it needs the space. Using CoW, both 
the VM hard drive and memory can be allocated in a manner consistent with NVM resource 
allocation while still preserving host resources.  
A HFH represents a specialized virtual environment and could therefore also defeat 
resource allocation detection methods by simply allocating resources similar to a NVM. A 
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HFH should be installed on a robust physical machine with ample resources to allow for 
adequate VM resource allocation or should incorporate CoW allocation methods to present 
the façade of NVM resource allocation.  
Defeating methods that are designed to detect the number of operational CPUs is a 
more difficult task; however, Lengyel also demonstrated this capability with Drakvuf [42]. 
Lengyel was able to defeat Paranoid Fish CPU detection methods by eliminating race 
conditions between virtual CPUs, allowing multiple virtual CPUs to be run safely in a 
virtualized environment. Drakvuf achieved this capability by utilizing Intel’s virtualization 
technology, which supports multiple Extended Page Tables (EPT) for virtualized 
environments, and Xen’s altP2M technology, which supports up to ten EPTs to be assigned 
to each virtual CPU [42], [44]. AltP2M is a clever method of changing EPT pointers by 
allowing the hypervisor to change the guest-physical to host-physical memory mapping on 
the fly [42]. These pointers can be independently adjusted for each virtual CPU and allow 
the hypervisor to manipulate what the guest can see in memory by changing the EPT to 
point to different areas in host-physical memory. This process is illustrated in Figure 20.  
  
At left, single EPT memory mapping is illustrated whereas at right, altP2M is illustrated 
demonstrating the capability to map guest-physical addresses to multiple machine-physical 
addresses, which represent host-physical memory.  
Figure 20. EPT Memory Mapping. Source: [42]. 
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A HFH would benefit from implementing altP2M technology, or something 
similar, that takes advantage of Intel’s hardware support for multiple EPTs. Similar to 
Drakvuf, a HFH could use multiple EPTs to ensure other hypervisor artifacts remain hidden 
or even potentially mask unique hypervisor behavior to avoid detection.  
c. HFV Memory Artifact Considerations 
A HFH must also account for artifact detection through memory pointers. The SIDT 
instruction used to detect the presence of a hypervisor, as discussed in the Chapter III, are 
all non-privileged instructions that will not cause a trap to the hypervisor, which is partly 
why they are so effective. To counteract this, a HFH would need to detect these instructions 
being executed and emulate a response back to the VM that would align with the 
appropriate NVM response.  
2. Behavior 
A behavioral difference that can be observed between an NVM and VM can be 
used to distinguish between the two machine types. HFV seeks to create a VM that more 
holistically captures NVM behavior, from the perspective of the guest VM. Therefore, it is 
crucial that all known HFV behavioral characteristics be considered when designing a 
HFH. A hypervisor that behaves like an NVM, or emulates NVM behavior more 
holistically, represents a significant step toward a comprehensive HFV implementation. A 
HFH that can successfully account for behavioral differences would provide a significant 
benefit in virtualization technology. Emulating NVM behavior at a high level of fidelity 
would make it significantly harder to detect the presence of the hypervisor. Behavior 
detection avoidance mechanisms would allow unique opportunities to develop and test 
software designed to take advantage of key NVM behavioral characteristics on a VM. This 
technology would allow high-fidelity, flexible, and secure testing environments that could 
be duplicated, adapted, or reset on the fly. 
A HFH would require stringent limitations from that of a traditional commercial 
hypervisor in order to be effective in mitigating identifying behaviors of VMs. Perhaps the 
most limiting mitigation would be to require the hypervisor to host only a single VM at a 
time. This requirement could be relaxed depending on the goals of the specific HFV 
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implementation, however, a hypervisor with co-hosted VMs could lead to detection via 
behavior methods as demonstrated by the team from Tokyo University of Technology [30], 
[32]. Noorifiza et al. [32] postulated that identifying behavior was observed due to the 
hypervisor’s simultaneous management of co-hosted VMs. Running a specialized, single 
VM on a HFH could help mitigate this behavior by eliminating the need for the hypervisor 
to multitask resources across multiple VMs.  
In addition, other options to specifically mitigate timestamping behavior include 
modifications in hypervisor design that enable timestamp manipulation. Timestamp 
manipulation at the hypervisor level could allow VM timestamp behavior to more closely 
align with NVM timestamp behavior by ensuring that all timestamps are encoded in a 
manner consistent with NVM timestamps. This added interposition function by the 
hypervisor would inadvertently lead to a potentially measurable time delay however, which 
could enable other hypervisor detection methods. 
A HFH would also not be able to utilize a guest-to-host communication channel, or 
any other hypervisor-specific functionality designed to improve end-user quality of 
service. Since the guest-to-host communication channel is easily detectable, conventional 
communication channels would need to be used for the host to communicate with the guest.  
Unfortunately, a HFH cannot address the unique problems presented by the 
behavior domain independently. As previously discussed in Chapter III, CPU behavior is 
also a significant indicator of the presence of virtualization. In order to fully implement the 
HFV behavior domain, adjustments in hardware support for virtualization must be made. 
These modifications are not trivial however and would require full redesign of CPU 
microarchitecture to satisfy HFV goals. From the behavior perspective, while 
modifications to CPU caches such as the TLB and RSB can be observed or detected during 
key virtualization events such as VM Exit, successful virtualization detection methods will 
persist. CPU redesign for the purposes of HFV is not practical in the near future, but as the 
use of virtualization continues to expand in cyber space, processor design could evolve to 
accommodate HFV principles.  
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3. Performance 
The performance domain is perhaps the most relevant domain not only to HFV, but 
virtualization technology in general. The performance domain is unique because it is the 
only HFV domain currently addressed by design considerations of commercial hypervisors 
on the market today. Performance is a crucial consideration in hypervisor design, and 
manufacturers must ensure they obey the efficiency property set forth by Popek and 
Goldberg to create a hypervisor that executes in as close to real-time NVM execution as 
possible. Although hypervisor vendors have developed efficient methods of implementing 
performance improvements, virtualization overhead is inherent to the concept of 
interposition through an added layer of abstraction between the hardware and VM, and 
cannot be fully eliminated. A comprehensive HFV implementation would seek to further 
mitigate the detection of performance differences between NVMs and VMs.  
a. HFV Timing Considerations 
A HFH could be extended to defeat local timing performance detection mechanisms 
by modifying the timing value returned back to the guest VM, making it appear as if there 
is no timing delay [19], [26]. Any timing measurement that utilizes local VM timing 
sources is susceptible to hypervisor introspection and can be influenced by the hypervisor. 
A HFH must incorporate mechanisms to defeat local timing detection methods to align 
with the concept of HFV.  
Remote detection methods are much more difficult for a HFH to overcome. If the 
observer utilizes an accurate remote timing source, the hypervisor cannot influence timing 
measurements directly and other mitigation methods must be developed. Most remote 
timing detection techniques require many iterations, often thousands, of specific 
instructions on the guest VM to induce a measurable timing delay from a remote source 
[26]. Blue Pill introduced a method to defeat remote timing detection mechanisms called 
Blue Chicken, whereby the hypervisor detects these repetitive iterations being executed as 
abnormal behavior [41]. Once Blue Pill detects that a remote timing test is being initiated 
on the VM, it uninstalls itself from the machine temporarily, setting a timer in the kernel 
for reinstallation. This process allows the remaining timing test to be executed directly on 
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physical hardware, without hypervisor interposition, resulting in the remote detector 
perceiving what appears to be NVM timing performance. After the timer has elapsed, Blue 
Pill reinstalls itself on the machine and restores hypervisor interposition.  
 Blue Chicken is a clever method of mitigating remote timing detection methods; 
however, it is not feasible for implementation in HFV. Blue Pill is a VMBR that consists 
of an ultra-thin hypervisor designed solely for the purposes of interposition; as such, it does 
not obey the rule of safety as set forth by Popek and Goldberg because isolation is not a 
goal of VMBRs [41]. Blue Pill can be easily loaded and unloaded on a machine due to its 
minimal footprint and requires no modification of the BIOS, boot sector, or system files 
[41]. A comprehensive HFH will require a robust, persistent installation to accommodate 
all HFV features. Loading and unloading a HFH on the fly will not be practical, therefore 
other methods of mitigating remote timing methods must be developed.  
A HFH could use the same detection techniques as Blue Pill to determine when a 
remote timing measurement is being executed in its guest VM. Rather than uninstalling 
upon detection, the hypervisor could halt the timing code execution and emulate an 
appropriate timing response based on the number of instruction iterations performed by the 
remote detector. This process would require prior knowledge of the code’s signature to 
enable detection and development of an appropriate and dynamic emulated timing response 
to be sent to the guest VM. As a result, this mitigation effort would be highly specialized 
and incapable of providing a solution for all remote timing techniques. Therefore, a HFH 
would be still be susceptible to remote timing detection methods.  
b. HFV CBD Considerations  
Counter-Based Detection (CBD) methods would also prove difficult to overcome 
in any HFV implementation. Since CBD requires no timing source and does not require 
kernel level privileges to execute, a HFH can do very little to mitigate this technique. As 
hardware support for virtualization allows unconditionally intercepted instructions—
instructions that always cause a VM exit when executed—to be executed from user mode, 
the ability to mitigate performance detection methods with software is near impossible. In 
the case of Intel, the CPUID instruction is an unconditionally intercepted instruction that 
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can be run in any privilege level [15]. While the VM is executing on an Intel CPU, a CPUID 
instruction will always cause a VM exit. This exit is a safety feature designed to ensure the 
guest VM does not gain direct access to the host CPU; however, it also enables an easy 
method to detect performance differences in VMs such as the method implemented in 
CBD. The CPUID instruction presents a bit of a paradox with respect to HFV. In an HFV 
model, the CPUID should still be capable of executing at any privilege level in order to 
support instruction serialization and instruction set fidelity. However, HFV would also seek 
to eliminate the CPUID instruction from causing an unconditional interception by the 
hypervisor to mitigate performance-measuring methods but this would violate the safety 
requirement set forth by Popek and Goldberg and give the VM direct access to the CPU. 
For these reasons, the performance domain poses the greatest challenges for HFV and may 
not be capable of being fully implemented without significant changes to hardware support 
for virtualization.  
c. HFV Graphical Considerations 
Graphical performance monitoring represents another challenge in HFV. 3D 
rendering performance in a VM is a blatant indicator of virtualization and must be 
addressed by HFV. The research conducted by Li et al. [24] was specifically designed to 
detect virtual appliances, a subset of virtual machines. Their research was primarily 
focused on detecting performance differences of virtual GPUs that are emulated in 
software. However, there are some GPU virtualization technologies that make graphical 
performance detection methods more difficult, such as GPU passthrough or directed I/O. 
Li et al. addressed this technology in their research, but their experiment was designed to 
detect virtual appliances, which would not normally use GPU passthrough technology. 
Intel released the capability to directly connect I/O devices to VMs with the release of Intel 
VT-d, which stands for Directed I/O, in 2007 [44]. Intel VT-d enables GPU passthrough 
functionality which allows VMs to directly connect to the GPU without interaction from 
the hypervisor, reducing virtualization overhead and greatly improving graphical 
performance [45]. Although graphical performance can be significantly improved by using 
direct passthrough methods, some researchers have still identified measurable differences 
when compared to NVM performance. Shea and Liu discovered that GPU performance 
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dropped from 85 FPS on a NVM, to 51 FPS on a VM when using direct GPU passthrough 
[46]. Although this is a significant performance increase over the graphical performance 
noted by Li et al., it still represents a measurable performance difference that could be 
disadvantageous for HFV.  
A HFH would most certainly need to take advantage of GPU passthrough 
technology, along with other directed I/O devices, to improve performance to near native 
speeds. Although GPU passthrough may not provide a comprehensive solution, it would 
provide worthwhile mitigation to graphical performance detection methods.  
4. Security 
HFV represents a subset of virtualization technology and therefore is inherently 
vulnerable to security concerns unique to the virtualization domain. Traditional 
virtualization security must only mitigate or defend against vulnerabilities, threats, and 
attacks specific to virtualized environments. HFV security must go one step further, 
however, by performing mitigation and defense without being detected from within the 
HFVM. Perhaps the best way to enforce HFV security goals is to isolate the security stack 
outside the HFVM. Drakvuf, mentioned previously in this chapter, offers a virtualization 
security solution that does just that and would perfectly complement HFV objectives in the 
security domain.  
Drakvuf is an extension of the Xen hypervisor which manages VM security from 
an external security stack that is isolated from the rest of the hypervisor [43]. It provides 
stealthy malware analysis through a nearly undetectable footprint from inside the VM [47]. 
Drakvuf uses a process hijacking procedure from the hypervisor to execute arbitrary code 
inside the VM [47]. This technique allows the hypervisor to conduct thorough malware 
analysis on guest VMs without their knowledge. Coupled with the stealthy nature of 
Drakvuf’s profile, it offers a complementary security solution that could be integrated into 
a HFH. A HFH with a Drakvuf extension would allow the hypervisor to mitigate artifact 
and behavioral characteristics, as mentioned previously in this chapter, in addition to 
providing security oversight for HFVMs. The additional interposition of the Drakvuf 
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extension, incorporated with additional HFV goals such as NVM security emulation, 
would offer a tailored, robust security solution for HFV.  
5. Functionality 
The functionality domain is a critical element of HFV from the guest perspective. 
A HFH must be able to accurately emulate the user functionality of a NVM within a 
HFVM. The user must be unable to observe a measurable functional difference in the 
HFVM for it to be successful at presenting holistic HFV.  
HFV must emulate virtual hardware with a high degree of fidelity to achieve the 
goals set forth in the functionality domain. Many hypervisor vendors do not offer high 
fidelity virtual hardware simply because there is no need for it in today’s virtualization 
market and writing high-fidelity virtual hardware entirely in software is not a trivial task 
[48]. However, as virtualization becomes more ubiquitous in cyber space and VMs become 
more specialized, the need for high-fidelity virtual hardware could grow. High-fidelity 
virtual hardware would provide a HFVM that more holistically represents a NVM, and 
would contribute to other HFV domains by mitigating detection methods based on virtual 
hardware artifacts or virtual hardware behavior. The ability to create high-fidelity virtual 
hardware that responds to induced failure conditions that cascade into the HFVM could 
greatly contribute to more realistic cyber operations. For instance, a virtual CPU fan 
malfunction could cause an overheating condition that automatically shuts down the 
HFVM.  
a. HFV Methodology for Cyber-Physical Systems 
As discussed in Chapter II Zhang et al. introduced a methodology for creating a 
holistic execution environment for a cyber-physical system by synchronizing a VM with a 
Physical Component Emulator (PCE) in MATLAB [18]. By adapting their methodology 
to our definition of HFV, it is possible to create high-fidelity virtual hardware that could 
be utilized for the functionality domain. As they point out, to holistically capture the 
relationship between cyber and physical components, a fully closed-loop, synchronized 
execution environment must be developed that can accurately capture the interdependent 
behavior between the two components [18]. Synchronization between cyber and physical 
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components is crucial to achieving high-fidelity [18]. Their experiment utilized differential 
equations to create a PCE in MATLAB and synchronized it with a VM using a specialized 
synchronization protocol they developed to model the physical components represented by 
a time continuum and the cyber components represented by discrete, step by step events 
[18]. This protocol, represented in Figure 21, is a continuous feedback loop between the 
state of the cyber component and the calculation of the differential equation in the PCE.  
 
Figure 21. Synchronization Protocol between Cyber Component and 
Physical Component. Source: [18]. 
The holistic execution environment implementing the synchronization protocol is 
illustrated in Figure 22. This virtual execution environment is created by providing an 
interface between a QEMU virtual machine running controller software and MATLAB, 
which is emulating state data of physical components. QEMU and MATLAB are linked 
together by the synchronization protocol (represented by the bottom portion of Figure 22) 
to create a single logical execution environment (represented by the upper portion of Figure 
22). This logical execution environment allows the interconnected programs to holistically 




Figure 22. Zhang et al. Holistic Execution Environment. Source: [18].  
b. HFV Methodology for Desktop Virtualization 
By adapting the work of Zhang et al., a HFV methodology can be established to 
create high-fidelity virtual hardware for desktop virtualization. Figure 23 illustrates the 




Figure 23. Virtual Hardware Holistic Execution Environment. 
The cyber component would be represented by a HFH with a VM installed. The 
HFH would have a Virtual Hardware Controller (VHC) module that interfaces with the 
PCE and the synchronization module. The PCE would consist of a single, physical 
hardware characteristic mapped by a differential equation in MATLAB. Utilizing the 
synchronization protocol introduced by Zhang et al., the VHC could be synchronized to 
the PCE to allow physical state data to be calculated based on discrete events that occur in 
the VM. High-fidelity virtual hardware could be created by feeding emulated physical 
hardware characteristics from the PCE to the VHC. The VHC could be programmed to 
induce specific behavior on the guest VM when it receives data from the PCE. For example, 
if the PCE was modelling CPU temperature, the VHC could initiate an overheating 
condition inside the guest VM when it received high temperatures from the PCE. In 
contrast, the VHC could also influence the PCE by sending specific state information based 
on VM performance that would result in a rise or drop in the modelled CPU temperature. 
The VHC could also feed emulated physical characteristics of the virtual hardware to the 
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guest VM to create a high-fidelity virtual environment from the user perspective. For 
example, providing CPU temperature information to the user inside the guest VM.  
The creation of high-fidelity virtual hardware using this method would comprise a 
major contribution to the concept of HFV; however, implementation would not be trivial. 
Modelling the physical behavior of hardware characteristics using differential equations 
would likely serve as the biggest challenge in a high-fidelity virtual hardware 
implementation using this methodology. An initial proof of concept might be implemented 
using an existing, open-source hypervisor, such as Xen, rather than developing a new 
hypervisor. Despite the open-source nature of Xen, developing a VHC module that 
interfaces with the hypervisor in a manner conducive to creating high-fidelity virtual 
hardware would also provide a challenge. However, with the development of other third-
party Xen hypervisor extensions such as Drakvuf, this task is certainly achievable.  
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided an analysis of the potential integration of each HFV 
characteristic domain into the development of a HFH. It discussed the unique challenges 
that each domain presents to the HFV concept and offered potential solutions to these 
challenges. Some HFV domain characteristics have already been developed and integrated 
into current hypervisors and could be incorporated into a HFH. Other HFV domain 
characteristics are relatively new concepts that have not yet been implemented in 
hypervisors, as in the case of the functionality domain. We discussed the benefits of a HFV 
implementation through the functionality domain and proposed an implementation 
methodology for specific virtual hardware characteristics to create high-fidelity virtual 
hardware. The next chapter provides a conclusion and discusses opportunities for future 
work.  
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V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
A. SUMMARY 
This thesis was motivated by the opportunity to extend the capabilities of virtual 
machines to enable the creation of high-fidelity virtual environments for use in cyber 
operations. We established a working taxonomy of virtualization domains to appropriately 
scope this thesis, and reviewed the current state of virtualization technology. We conducted 
research to aggregate and categorize fidelity variance between virtual machines and their 
physical counterparts, and classified these variances into five domains based on their 
unique characteristics and potential for application in HFV. Further, we conducted an in-
depth analysis on each domain to assess the challenges and practicality of implementation 
in a HFV environment. Finally, we presented a methodology to emulate physical 
characteristics of virtual hardware to create a high-fidelity virtual machine.  
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The conclusions from this thesis are drawn from the research objective, and three 
research questions.  
1. Research Objective 
The objective of this research was to identify potential methods of creating high-
fidelity virtual environments conducive to specialized cyber operations. Through our 
analysis in Chapter IV, we assessed five different domains that can be implemented in 
varying degrees to create high-fidelity virtual environments.  
The artifact, behavior, and performance domains can be integrated into a HFH to 
improve fidelity by increasing stealth and equivalence. These domains can be incorporated 
in HFV to help create a more holistic representation of a NVM by making it more difficult 
to detect the presence of virtualization. A hypervisor that more effectively hides its own 
presence appears more like a NVM to a user in the guest VM.  
The security domain could be integrated into a HFH hypervisor to improve fidelity 
by mitigating the threats and vulnerabilities associated with virtualization. Enforcing NVM 
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security from an external security stack outside the HFVM would help provide a secure 
operating environment that would be difficult to detect by HFVM users.  
The functionality domain can be implemented in a HFH to improve fidelity by 
introducing high-fidelity virtual hardware. High-fidelity virtual hardware would offer a 
level of NVM emulation not present in current virtualization technology and would enable 
cyber operations that specifically take advantage of hardware behavior and side effects to 
occur in a virtualized environment.  
 These five domains may be implemented in a HFV solution individually, or in 
tandem, to create varying levels of high-fidelity virtual environments based on the specific 
objectives of tailored cyber operations.  
2. Research Questions 
This thesis was bounded by three research questions to guide the research process 
and support the research objective. Final conclusions for this thesis were derived by 
answering these questions.  
a. What specific characteristics not currently implemented in modern 
virtualization technology could be included to extend a VM to create a 
high-fidelity virtualized environment? 
We conducted research in Chapter III to identify and categorize the differences 
between VMs and NVMs. The sheer multitude of variance between the two warranted the 
creation of five domains to present the varying characteristics in an organized manner. We 
discovered that the variance between VMs and NVMs can be categorically described by 
the way they look, behave, and perform from the perspective of the user. We also 
discovered variance associated with vulnerabilities and overall capability available to the 
user. These categories of variance were organized into five domains to allow further 
research in their suitability for HFV implementation in Chapter IV.  
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b. Which of these domains could be used to influence the behavior of a 
virtual machine if emulated appropriately? 
Based on our analysis in Chapter IV, the functionality domain would be best suited 
as to influence the behavior of a virtual machine in ways that current virtualization 
technology cannot achieve. While all HFV domains would offer fidelity improvements 
over NVMs, the functionality domain offers the most potential improvement that could be 
used to influence the behavior of a virtual machine in a manner consistent with NVM 
behavior. The artifacts, performance, and security domains would all improve fidelity; 
however, their integration into HFV would have little effect at creating a platform for 
influencing VM behavior. The behavior domain represents a potential for influencing VM 
behavior but provides a very limited avenue to do so. We defined the behavior domain to 
consist of CPU behavior and hypervisor behavior. CPU behavior is beyond the scope of 
this thesis and cannot be applied to HFV. The integration of the hypervisor behavior sub-
domain in HFV would mainly consist of removing unique hypervisor behavior that can be 
used as a form of detection, such as guest-to-host communication channels, rather than 
introducing new behavior. Therefore, the behavior domain is not as well suited as the 
functionality domain for the purposes of this thesis. If emulated properly, the functionality 
domain could provide virtual hardware that more holistically emulates physical hardware. 
This high-fidelity virtual hardware would introduce physical sensor data into virtual 
environments that could be manipulated to induce specific VM behavior that mirrors NVM 
behavior under the same circumstances.  
c. How could one of these characteristics be emulated at a level of fidelity 
necessary to influence VM behavior in the same manner it would 
influence NVM behavior? 
In Chapter IV, we presented a methodology for emulating characteristics in the 
functionality domain to create a high-fidelity virtual environment. We decided to adopt a 
similar methodology presented by Zhang et al. because creating high-fidelity virtual 
hardware for HFV is similar to the virtual cyber-physical system they presented in their 
work. Zhang et al. created a virtual execution environment to connect a virtual controller 
to an emulated physical component. We hope HFV can accomplish the same goal by 
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modifying their methodology to connect a virtual machine to emulated hardware 
characteristics to effectively extend the functionality of a virtual machine. This extended 
functionality would be provided in the form of high-fidelity virtual hardware created by 
our methodology.  
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research was conducted as a preliminary step toward achieving the larger goal 
of implementing HFV. This thesis served to establish the foundational work necessary to 
begin creating a high-fidelity virtual environment. Future work should focus on creating a 
proof of concept for HFV based on the methodology presented in this thesis. Future work 
can be broken into three separate endeavors: creating a physical component emulator, a 
virtual hardware controller, and a high-fidelity hypervisor.  
1. Physical Component Emulator 
The PCE should be developed to accurately emulate a specific physical hardware 
characteristic, such as CPU temperature. This characteristic could be modelled in 
MATLAB using a differential equation to model physical characteristic information based 
on state data. Further research is required to develop a differential equation that models the 
physical state of a specific characteristic. The PCE should be designed with further HFV 
integration in mind and must be able to communicate directly with the VHC. 
2. Virtual Hardware Controller 
The VHC must be designed to communicate with the PCE and the hypervisor 
directly. This communication channel will allow the VHC to act as a logic controller 
between virtual and emulated physical components. The VHC must be capable of 
dynamically inducing behavior in the VM as well as in the PCE to effectively create a 
closed loop system. Initial development of the VHC could be achieved by extending a pre-
existing, open-source hypervisor. The Xen hypervisor offers a flexible integration platform 
and would serve as a good candidate for use in the development of the VHC. As 
demonstrated by Drakwuf, custom modules can be created to integrate with the Xen 
hypervisor.  
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3. High-Fidelity Hypervisor 
The ultimate goal of this research is to create a hypervisor designed around the 
principles of stealth, fidelity, and equivalence. Ideally, this hypervisor would be designed 
to integrate all five HFV domains described in Chapter III. A HFH would mitigate 
virtualization detection techniques while also providing a platform for the creation of high-
fidelity virtual hardware. Extensive further research is required to design and create a HFH.   
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